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Scenarios, Simulations, and Games
James John Tritten
"Surprise and the single Scenarios" is the title of a rather
thought provoking article by Sir James Cable. The essence of his
article is that the United Kingdom should not prepare its
military with just one contingency in mind. Related theses have
been debated in the East and West for many years; should Soviet
military strategy be based upon the doctrinal assumption of quick
escalation to nuclear war? Should U.S. nuclear forces be
procured with the requirement to survive a well executed surprise
first strike?
In considering these and related politico-military
questions, scenarios are often created to flesh out the concept
or the problem being considered. For the purposes of this paper,
a scenario is defined as a statement of the assumptions made
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about the international politico-military environment.
For example, military planners in the USSR have used
alternating scenarios to consider possible paths that armed
conflict could take in order to assess the impact of short or
long time scales on the nature of the conflict. Similarly,
they have used those time variables to assess the course of
nuclear and conventional warfare interactions and vice versa;
e.g. if a European NATO war is likely to be nuclear from almost
the beginning, then it is likely to be over quickly, hence
planning scenarios lasting months are unrealistic. Yet if the
war goes nuclear in Europe quickly, then the USSR must solve its
"America problem" caused by U.S. nuclear forces maintained in
North America or at sea and outside of the immediate theater of
military operations.
Similarly, varying scenarios are used by American defense
specialists to demonstrate the impact of different scenario
threat assumptions on the amount and types of nuclear forces that
the U.S. should buy that would "guarantee" an acceptable level of
retaliation. For example, if the war is expected to start in
Europe, then "bolt from the blue" scenarios of surprise nuclear
attacks on North America may not be as realistic as those which
assume strategic warning.
Scenario creation is an acceptable methodology used by
political scientists for developing alternative futures as an
educational device or to create an input that will then be used
3for other purposes.
Scenario writing exercises have the advantage of being
extremely adaptable; they can combine aspects of a number of
other methodologies (therefore minimizing the drawbacks of a
single method) and can be tailored to specific objectives or
environments. They can force the participant to deal with the
comprehensive effects of decisions and multiple paths that events
might take. Depending upon the participants, a scenario writing
exercise can be an extremely creative environment with great
potential to break beyond normal modes of thinking. Since they
result in a verbal description of the environment, they are
reasonably user friendly and likely to be read. Scenario writing
is very easy to do and relatively inexpensive.
One drawback of scenario writing exercises is that if they
are not tied to some follow-on event, they can lead to idle
speculation without participants being held responsible. If tied
to some other methodology , such as a simulation or game, the
exercise might replicate the flaws of the input and magnify the
impact of the error. The credibility of the scenario is limited
by the expert judgment of the scenario builder. Writing
scenarios is extremely resource intensive.
Scenarios are also used to support technical evaluation of
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weapons systems. Scenarios in support of such evaluations must
adequately define the spectrum of a weapons system's operating
environment so that a full and balanced evaluation can be made of
its capabilities. Whereas scenarios used in support of technical
evaluations can be overcome with good analysis, in the social
sciences, one can argue that the scenario can even predestine the
results of the analysis.
Rather than bemoan such limitations of politico-military
scenarios, it is my intent to explore the opportunities and
drawbacks of scenarios used in simulations and gaming when such
techniques are used to explore complex questions for education,
research, or persuasion.
What Does a Scenario Depend Upon?
It has been argued that politico-military scenarios have an
intrinsic worth of their own; that they should be thought out and
then stored on a shelf to be plucked off when necessary to
support some future simulation, game, analysis, or operation.
The alternative view is that scenarios support other actions,
hence have no value of their own and should therefore not be
created to await call-up at a later date.
The most important determinant of the scenario is the
purpose for which it will be used. The purpose of the scenario
writing exercise or the simulation or game that a scenario
supports will be influenced by and in turn influence a number of
other factors such as available time, location, scenario time,
sponsors, and player/participants. These additional factors will
be discussed later. At this point, three major purposes will be
considered; training/education, research, and persuasion.
Training/Education
Many simulations are done for training and each of those
reguires a scenario. A basic example of this is the fire drill
for a ship's crew or the emergency procedures trainer for flight
crews. In these simulations, the scenario is used to set a semi-
realistic condition reguiring personnel to exercise their skills
in some area that otherwise would not be experienced. The
emergency conditions are carefully controlled and participants
are allowed to walk through their procedures, stop and analyze
specific actions, or repeat them if necessary. Once practiced in
a simulation, personnel actions taken in an actual emergency have
the advantage of this type of preparation.
On a more sophisticated level, education also makes use of
scenarios. When introducing the concept of alternative futures,
scenario writing is an acceptable methodology. The student
benefits from the experience of having to flesh out all of the
particulars required to complete a scenario.
Long ago, lawyers recognized the value of moot court to
assist candidates in becoming practicing attorneys. Similarly,
model United Nations or governments are often used to expose
students to the workings and authority of complex bodies. These
type educational simulations only make sense if some actions are
required to be taken; a scenario is played out.
When students here have to go through the steps necessary to
pass a bill or to defend a client, they see how political
decisions are made and they have the opportunity to refine their
skills in such settings. Players and participants in these type
simulations have the opportunity to learn much more than the
facts of the process being simulated .
For example, the purpose of a scenario creation exercise, a
simulation, or a game may be advertised as an exploration of some
particular concept or facet of war. In reality, however, the
real purpose may be to educate senior operationally-oriented
military officers about the political nature of war. In order to
accomplish such a educational exercise, a very sophisticated and
well thought out scenario is required.
Simulation and gaming may be the most successful way to
educate some of these individuals. Despite the fact that there
are numerous articles and books on the relationship of war and
politics, or that there are many university level courses one
could take to discuss this area, the busy military officer may
not have had the opportunity to do any of these. Exposure to a
well constructed simulation or game with a supporting scenario
might be just the short course necessary to get important points
across to an audience within the "system." It has been my
experience that gaming is not a pejorative term to the military
and many officers are eager to "learn" from such exercises.
Similarly, to reach foreign policy experts or academics with
a message on the limits of military capability to support
political options, a well-crafted scenario supporting a
simulation or game is an excellent method to force these
individuals to "crunch the numbers" and get a better feel for
7
what is possible. Again, seminars, courses, books, or articles
could do the same job but "experiencing" the event may provide an
opportunity for learning that will last beyond the short-term.
Where the objective of a scenario writing exercise or a
simulation or game is identical in two exercises, but on the one
hand military officers are the participants, and on the other
hand civilian academics are, a very different scenario would be
required. This should be obvious but too often gamers argue that
one scenario can serve a multitude of purposes.
Games can be an excellent vehicle to expose participants to
dynamic asymmetries in Soviet-American war fighting styles or in
war termination requirements. A well thought out scenario can be
used to help Western Army officers understand that a future war
in Europe/the Soviet Western Theater of Military Strategic
Operations might not necessarily be represented by a series of
pistons along avenues of advance. The Soviet preferred method and
style of operation is instead, envelopment and encirclement. In
this case, the war as fought by NATO might not necessarily be the
same as that being fought by the Warsaw Pact. This creates
complicated requirements for the scenario design and play of a
game but a game may be the best vehicle to illustrate the point.
Gaming complex issues also require scenarios capable of
moving from one spectrum of politics and war to another in order
to play out all possible interactions that might occur. For
example, in simulating the arms control negotiation process, one
needs to factor in the role of legislatures, courts, public
opinion, the media, allies, etc. to more fully flesh out the
complex interactions that influence or are influenced by the arms
control issue at hand.
Similarly, a complete war game should not deal only with the
armed conflict portion of the war. To do so will lead
participants to believe that escalation decisions only involve
moving up or down the so-called vertical escalation ladder or
expanding/limiting armed conflict horizontally beyond or to
theaters of origin. A more correct representation of war
involving political, economic, moral and similar arenas would
reveal that escalation also involves economic warfare, world
public opinion, actions by allies, and the very crucial variable
of time. Time as a variable in warfare is a most frequently
overlooked one that scenarios by their very nature force
participants to deal with. The act of extending the period of a
war is also more correctly viewed as escalation. Figure (1) is
a representation of the armed conflict portion of warfare that
becomes obvious and is reinforced by scenario writing or the play
of a game or simulation. Similar diagrams need to be created for
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A well designed supporting scenario can help participants of
a simulation or game better understand the relationship of
political interests to required military capabilities. They also
can help those in positions of authority to understand that not
only is war a competitive process, but so is the period between
the armed conflict portion of wars.
By their very nature, games and simulations tend to focus
investigation of outputs rather than inputs. This is a worthwhile
goal for education that is well served by the use of games and
simulations. As an example, a war game dealing with the AIRLAND
battle or follow-on forward attack (FOFA) operations will help
illuminate the net worth of either of the the concepts in
achieving their objectives; not on input measures, i.e. the
intrinsic nature of the command structure or on the forces to be
purchases. If the emphasis is on process (demonstrating the
value of looking at output measures), then one type of scenario
would be used to support such a game. If the emphasis is on
substance (trying to assess the worth of the AIRLAND battle or
FOFA) , then a different type of scenario might be required; one
that supported research and was not tailored toward education.
Scenarios used for training and education must be credible
to the participants and obviously feasible to support the
exercise within the allotted time period. As we move from
scenarios used for training and education to those used in
support of research, the requirement for credibility subsides.
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Research
Similarly, scenario writing, games and simulations can be
conducted for the purpose of research. For example, such
exercises can be sponsored for the purpose of stimulating
participants well-experienced in some specific area to think
creatively about a subject that they had thought was previously
"mined out." This type exercise requires a much more
sophisticated scenario than one constructed for an education-
supporting exercise.
A free-wheeling seminar game, whose scenario allows
flexibility, might be just the vehicle to create interaction
between a group of experts who otherwise feel that they have to
represent organizational interests. A shared topic of interest
can be openly discussed by a group of experts using such a non-
threatening seminar environment by offering no identification of
the affiliations of the participants, by not using titles or
ranks, by mixing in government and non-government participants,
and by frequently reminding the participants that "after all,
this is just a 'game'."
The results of such interactions might well exceed that
produced by more traditional methods. As an example, a group of
individuals who have already written numerous articles and books
on the subject of war termination might find that they stimulate
others and in turn are stimulated by the interactions of a game
whose scenario was designed to explore this issue. They might
find that offering non-traditional options in a gaming
11
environment is more acceptable than by presenting them at a
formal conference. Obviously, scenarios must be flexible for
such exercises and may totally have to be re-written during a
simulation or game to support the path that participants desire
to go in order to properly address an issue.
Path gaming is a new type of seminar style game that has
recently been used in the Washington environment. Path games
present special challenges for scenarios. Rather than being a
simulation or game of a specific event, the seminar is used to
explore alternative futures.
One type of path game will pick a specific alternative
future, say the president's dream of a defense-dominate world or
one in which there are no ballistic missiles. The scenario for
such a game is to go from the present time and move along one or
many paths to that goal. The scenario for such a game may either
be fixed or flexible.
Other types of path games move from the present to an
unspecified future along whatever path the participants desire to
explore. This type of path game is the most challenging for the
scenario writer since major portions of the scenario literally is
made up during the game itself. This degree of flexibility calls
for the use of scenario writers with considerable experience and
special skills.
To get a group to consider extremely complicated issues, war
termination being a good example, the scenario required might be
one that is capable of knocking the legs out from under the
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players. Using that case, rather than have a scenario created out
of the more customary cases of possible future wars, a totally
unexpected but intriguing scenario might be just the vehicle to
cause participants to focus on the major issue rather than how to
fight or prevent the war in the first place.
Games and simulations may in fact be a major input to
follow-on analysis conducted for very specific purposes. In such
cases, the scenario is constrained by the requirement to support
the follow-on analysis. Thus while in some cases, it is entirely
appropriate (and may even be necessary) to re-write a scenario
during a "creative" exploration simulation or game used for
research, other types of games may have to rigidly follow the
"script" in order to stick to the issues that will be addressed
during follow-on hard analysis. Obviously selection of players
can be crucial to the feasibility of conducting either type game.
Many scenario writing exercises, simulations, and games are
designed to explore strategy/force mismatches. One major option
for such exercises is to hold to a desired scenario and then
manipulate the force structure, exploring the impact of varying
possible force structures on the ability to attain goals.
Alternatively, forces can be held constant, and the scenario or
strategy varied, exploring the possibilities of new strategies.
The latter can be very helpful in illuminating better
methods of conducting near-term campaigns with existing forces
already on hand. Generally, programming is better served by
scenarios that manipulate forces while war planning is enhanced
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by variations in strategy while holding the forces constant.
Each type of exercise (programming or war planning) would reguire
vastly different types of supporting scenarios. Scenario
writing, games and simulations can allow nations to test new
doctrines, concepts of operations, strategies, operations,
tactics, or alternative force postures.
Programming and war planning games differ significantly but
both need to account for the differences between declaratory
policies, doctrine, and strategies and actual ones in scenario
creation. Although forces tend to fight like they train, the
actions nations threaten in order to support deterrence, are not
necessarily the ones that nations governed by real people will
take when events actually unfold. An examination of a future
campaign or war based upon declaratory strategies, etc. might
look significantly different than if such an examination were
based upon actual plans. Obviously, actual plans and actual
capabilities of own forces is a carefully guarded secret, hence
the pool of potential players might be totally different for each
type exercise which in turn will have an influence on the type of
scenario created.
Different scenarios may be needed to support examination of
the actions and statements nations make to deter war, the very
different actions taken when planning to fight a war, the
potential for a total change in operations when actually engaged
in combat operations, and the possibility that all deterrent
concepts, pre-war plans, or the actual conduct of operations
14
might have no influence on the the quite unique circumstances
undertaken to terminate war-fighting.
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, Royal Dutch/Shell used a
technique of "scenario planning" in order to prepare their
8business for a wide variety of futures. One of the results of
this effort was that Shell's management was better prepared for
the 1973 oil crisis. Shell's scenario planning forced managers to
deal with uncertainty and thereby understand and anticipate risk.
It also helped them discover strategic options that they were not
seriously aware of. Such an exercise afforded Shell the
opportunity to gain a competitive advantage.
Competitive strategies are only recently beginning to gain
acceptance within the Pentagon. Gaming is a very useful
methodology to explore competitive strategies. By forcing
players to consider outputs and by tying military outputs to
political objectives, the player is confronted by the need to
define (or demand) explicit goals. He is further introduced to
the concept of international competition during the armed
conflict, after it, and obviously before.
The United States has finally come about and recognized that
in "peacetime," we are engaged in a long-term competitive
9
relationship with the Soviet Union and other nations. It is the
authors opinion that with the arrival of nuclear weapons, the
strategic thinking of many strategists, especially those in the
military, excludes the concept of competition and the use of the
term "winning."
15
Whether or not one can "win" a future war, or whether or not
we are in a competitive relationship with the USSR is not the
issue for this paper. One can argue that the Soviets accept
"winning" as the logical goal of any political conflict, but even
if one assumes future wars are to be fought to a draw or that
there is no competition between nations, scenarios and games
offer governments the opportunity to explore ways to gain
competitive advantage or to at least force an opponent into a
situation where he will not attempt to "win."
Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz ' s experience prior to World War
II in gaming possible conflict in the Pacific theater have often
been cited as one of the best examples of the value of gaming.
Gaming efforts of the faculty and staff of the Naval War College
in Newport between the World Wars allowed Nimitz to later remark
that:
"The war with Japan had been re-enacted in the game
room here by so many people and in so many different
ways that nothing that happened during the war was a
surprise - absolutely nothing except the Kamikaze
tactics toward the end of the war; we had not
visualized those."
One major difference in those war games and some of the ones
being conducted today is, of course, that for Nimitz, "winning"
in war was a perfectly natural and acceptable goal and therefore
written into scenarios.
New techniques of artificial intelligence-like systems offer
us the opportunity to explore wider ranges of alternative futures
11 *than have ever been possible before. Some have even argued that
such systems offer the possibility of generating scenarios for
16
12human use. With the speed available in these new techniques,
instead of running one or even a handful of game and simulations
each year, modern simulations centers will be able to run
literally hundreds of alternate cases.
By manipulating one or a few variables and holding the rest
constant, analyst may be better able to perform sensitivity and
contingency analysis like they have never been able to do in
manual games. A supporting system such as this, if it were in
support of a large manpower intensive game such as Global at the
Naval War College, could be used by the Control team to "game the
game" and create well-designed scenarios.
Scenario writing, simulations, nor games are a substitute
for reality nor a method of analysis but such new techniques
afford us a tool to investigate alternate future scenarios and
thereby assist analysts in assessing their impact. In other
words, given a set of "what if" political, military, or economic
conditions, modern gaming techniques can help government and
businesses explore alternative futures that they might have to
deal with.
Although the advantages and opportunities of new gaming
techniques are beginning to be appreciated, enormous caution must
be exercised in their use. The modeling community cannot allow
its sponsors to think that scenarios generated by or gaming and
simulation lessons and insights that result from the manipulation
i
of software or machines are any more "scientific" or "important"
than those gained from any simulation technique.
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Since scenarios are intimately tied to simulations and
games, they are also tied to the intelligence communities threat
assessment process and also to the creation of net assessments.
In both cases, alternative scenarios need to be assessed and the
use of modern computers can be a great aid. The more, however,
that games and simulations attempt to explore combat, or other
areas that we cannot actually duplicate, the more interest there
is in and requirement for good scenarios.
Scenarios used to support research must be feasible but not
necessarily credible. To support research, an incredible
scenario might even be preferred. Where incredible scenarios are
used, Control teams must ensure that appropriate disclaimers are
used or classification protects the sensitivity of the concepts.
Persuasion
Another use of scenarios is to create perceptions. For
example; (1) if the Politburo reads in the Western open
literature that NATO commanders say that due to incomplete
funding for conventional defense, NATO will have to resort to
early use of nuclear weapons in self-defense; and (2) the Soviets
perceive that there are nuclear weapons in Europe; and (3) the
Warsaw Pact military reports that there are frequent exercises by
NATO whose scenarios demonstrate that they are clearly designed
to practice the early release of such weapons; then the Politburo
would be justified in reaching the conclusion if they break the
i
peace, they risk nuclear war fighting. In such an environment, to
exercise (or simulate or game) without a scenario that lends
18
support to the perception intended, would be to undermine
deterrence!
Similarly, scenarios offer the opportunity for marketing
ideas and consensus building. For example, if a simulation or
game was sponsored by an organization that was attempting to
market an idea or a product, one should not be surprised to find
scenarios that supported that idea or product. The ethics of
running such exercises are no more complicated than the ethics of
creating a motion picture, study, or book that has an underlying
13
message of "sales."
Since it appears that there is a type of individual that is
more likely to receive messages if they are found in simulations
and games (just as there those who are egually turned off), then
by holding a series of structured exercises with pre-packaged
scenarios and strong controls, it is likely that a significant
number of key individuals could be influenced to the point that a
consensus could be built.
During the inter-war years, the Navy and War Departments
cooperated in the development of war plans by the Joint Planning
Committee. Resulting from their efforts was the creation of a
war plan in 1924 against Japan, called War Plan Orange. The
substance of Orange changed over the years and Orange itself was
never used as the actual blueprint for combat in the Pacific, but
the Navy gamed campaigns at the Naval War College up to the
commencement of hostilities using Orange as its basis.
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Orange as the basis for a scenario for a series of games
that were fought over an extended period of time allowed the
military to socialize its officer corps about the likelihood of a
future war. When the war came, those regular officers who had
participated in these exercises understood the basic concepts of
the campaigns that would have to be fought and were at a distinct
advantage. Years of scenario writing, simulations, and games
over the NATO central front should yield us similar advantage.
The Navy Maritime Strategy is another example of a scenario
writing exercise that has had major influence on a number of
other endeavors. Whether or not you agree with the Maritime
Strategy is not as important as the fact that when the term is
used to naval officers in any fleet today, the same broad
strategic scenario comes to mind. Perhaps most importantly, the
Maritime Strategy unified the scenario for a future war among the
"barons" in Washington who were previously setting different
contexts for the programs and concepts that they were advocating.
Considerations in Designing Scenarios
Although there should not be a "cookbook" for the creation
of scenarios, it has become apparent to me in dealing with a
number of individuals who have been asked to create scenarios,
14that some very key factors are often overlooked. Hence, the
following discussion is designed to assist the specialist in
gaming and simulations when considering a task to create a
scenario.
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First - The scenario must be dependent upon the overall
purpose of the exercise. As has been discussed earlier, whether
or not a game or simulation is being played out for training,
education, analysis and exploration, perception management, or
consensus building, the purpose of the exercise will have a major
and first order impact on the scenario selected.
If a game is designed to validate or perform sensitivity
analysis on a previous game, there will be major constraints on
the scenario. The scenario, in such a case, would have to be
identical to the one used in the original game. The control team
from the first game would have had to keep close watch on the
conduct of that game in order to detect and record in-game
modifications to the scenario. Obviously, artificial
intelligence-like systems will automatically record the full
scenario making this task easier.
Second - The available game time significantly influences
the scenario that can be played. Global war games at the Naval
War College that last weeks can go into much more depth than a
half-day or one-day game held in Washington by participants who
are often answering phone calls while engaged in the play. This
is not to say that the long game is necessarily superior to the
short simulation; that judgment depends on a number of factors,
it is only to say that the scenario depends upon how long one can
play.
One can attempt to increase the depth of the short game
scenario by asking participants to read it prior to the game.
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This may not work for the busy participant and may not even be
worth the efforts. Naturally if a scenario contains classified
material, the requirements to safeguard such material and account
for transit time may preclude this option entirely.
Third - The players themselves will significantly influence
the scenarios. In my initial example of a fire drill, the
scenario could be very brief and the players are likely to be
technical specialists not concerned with major questions of
policy. On the other hand, if one seeks the participation of
chief executive officers, branch and department heads, the
scenarios will most likely be very heavily oriented for major
policy question and concern itself at the strategic level. Macro
analysis versus micro analysis as the purpose during the game
will result in vastly different scenarios. Similarly, the
participation by players with experience and/or education can
also have a profound influence on the scenario. A macro approach
war game for flag and general officers might require a scenario
with significant emphasis on political context. The same
scenario when used for a group of academics might not work at
all.
Fourth - The scenario also depends upon the time and setting
of the simulation; i.e. what period of time the sponsor desires
gamed and where the game is to be played. Time is a frequently
mishandled variable. Whereas scenarios for present day games
may be more easily created, the formulation of future
scenarios challenges even the best political scientist. Yet
precisely for this reason, games, simulations, and scenarios
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planning are powerful tools to help analysts gain insight into
the future.
Even replaying historical events with variations can
challenge historians to create an artificial environment of what
might have been. Historical scenarios can be surrogates for
present day situations that are otherwise awkward to handle. A
good example of this is the Soviet military method of using
historical scenarios to make points about questions of current
doctrine, strategy, operational art and tactics in an Aesopian
web that substitute historical case study for the present or
anticipated future.
The physical location of a game is also a major but often
overlooked factor in setting a scenario. Exercises that cannot
accommodate classified material will require only unclassified
scenarios and data bases. Facilities that limit the number of
players or that do not have the use of modern artificial
intelligence-like support systems or other computers aids will
result in less sophisticated scenarios than these which have
these advantages.
Fifth - The sponsor of a game is a major variable in setting
a scenario. If the sponsor desires to use the game to assist in
the exploration in the nature of war campaigns, then a scenario
that focuses on crisis response and arms control is totally out
of place. Similarly, one would expect that if an agency sponsored
a game, then the designers of the game and scenario would be
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either specifically or indirectly influenced by current or future
programs or preferred strategies.
Final Observations
Scenarios for political-military simulations or games do not
need to be as detailed as one might imagine. For example, if a
game starts with the current world conditions "as is," a detailed
state of the world or major intelligence briefing is probably not
required for the players. Control, however, needs to have vast
amounts of background material. New advances in computer aids or
in artificial intelligence will greatly assist both players and
control in keeping track of scenario state.
Unfortunately, there is no simple answer to the question of
how detailed and complex a scenario must be. A large complex
scenario might turn off senior players who simply do not have the
time to be brought up to speed for a temporary exercise.
Similarly, a excruciatingly detailed scenario might so stifle the
players that a creative intellectual environment cannot be
achieved.
Scenarios simply cannot be written and left on a shelf to be
pulled off when required. The factors that influence the
scenario are far too numerous and important for such a process,
although one might use such stored scenarios as a strawman. Each
scenario must be tailored to the specific purpose of the
exercise, time available, the time period to be used as specified
by the sponsor, the capabilities of the participants, the
setting, and the available facilities.
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Good scenario writing can assist sponsors in using games
and simulations to illuminate differences in perceptions,
different concepts of operations, and to make concrete certain
difficult to understand abstract concepts. As such, games and
their supporting scenarios become one more tool for political-
military training and education, research, and persuasion.
Scenario creation also results in a check list of actions to be
considered during real operations.
Scenarios creation in fact can be so important to the gaming
and simulation process that a case can be made that the input
phase of the game might even yield a higher pay off to the
sponsor than will the results, lessons learned, and other
outputs. The process of extracting the insights from the
creation of a game, or its conduct, is an extremely difficult and
time consuming process; one which takes longer than most sponsors
are willing to allow.
The measure of effectiveness for a good scenario is whether
or not it helped the participants and control do something else
satisfactorily. If more time is spent explaining or discussing
the scenario than on the issues that the game or simulation is
designed to explore, then the scenario was probably not worth it.
Good analysis can probably overcome the deficiencies of a bad
scenario but a good scenario by itself does not ensure a good
writing exercise, simulation, or game.
We cannot afford to look only at single politico-military
scenarios. Rather, a wide variety of scenarios should be examined
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as a sensitivity or contingency test: i.e. if findings hold up
regardless of the scenario, then we can feel more confident about
them. To only game a single scenario invites the type of myopia
that lead to over reliance by the French on its Maginot Line or
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